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According to International Relations (IR) orthodoxy, the story of three Great 
Debates accounts for the most important theoretical developments in the 
discipline. Over the last decade, critical historiographers have established 
that the story of a First Debate, which tells of a struggle between idealism 
and realism between the 1920s and 1940s, is a misleading caricature of 
early academic international thought. This article adds to this critical 
literature by tracing the manner in which the story of a First Debate became 
a part of disciplinary orthodoxy between the 1950s and 1980s. Our analysis 
reveals that a myth of a First Debate was produced when more recent 
scholars detached the concept of a struggle between idealism and realism 
from both the unique historical milieu in which this dichotomy was 
conceived, and the rhetorical purposes for which it was employed. We use 
these findings to make the case for a contextual approach to disciplinary 
historiography, and to illuminate the historical contingency of contemporary 
notions of scholarly purpose in IR. 
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International relations’ first great debate: 
Context and tradition 
DARSHAN VIGNESWARAN1 AND JOEL QUIRK2  
INTRODUCTION 
The academic analysis of international relations (IR) has been charac-
terised by a wide range of shifts, contests, dialogues and discoveries. Over 
the last two decades a popular way of accounting for this matrix of 
intellectual development has been the notion that the field has evolved 
through a chronological sequence of Great Debates. The three ‘stories’3 
that comprise the Great Debate narrative each describe seminal periods of 
intellectual change by outlining the manner in which an entrenched 
orthodoxy was challenged by the rise of a new scholarly approach. In 
recent years a number of scholars have challenged the veracity of the first 
contest in this debating sequence. The First Debate tells a story about the 
history of international thought in the 1920s and 1930s when a homo-
geneous category of nameless idealists engaged in an intellectual struggle 
with a new generation of realists. In this article we move beyond existing 
critiques of a First Debate by exploring the manner in which the story 
became part of disciplinary orthodoxy. We contend that IR theorists have 
collectively substantiated misleading images of historical development in 
international thought by incorrectly incorporating the interwar years into a 
developing tradition of internal debating.  
Our interest in this topic was originally sparked by the observation that 
prominent misconceptions of the history of international thought have 
1  Doctoral Candidate, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University.
2  Doctoral Candidate, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 
International Studies Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, February 2003. We greatly appreciate 
the important contributions of Malcolm Cook, Greg Fry, Jim George, Nicole George, Sarah Graham, 
Mary-Louise Hickey, Paul Keal, Anna Rajander, Chris Reus-Smit, Leonard Seabrooke, Shogo Suzuki, 
Tianbiao Zhu, and the numerous participants of the IR Theory Reading Group.
3  For the most part we will refer to the historical account of the First Debate as a ‘story’ or ‘narrative’, our 
use of the pejorative term ‘myth’ will be limited to those instances when we intend to indicate the 
misleading characteristics of the concept.
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persisted despite the existence of a substantial body of historiographical 
work in the discipline. IR has a rich literature in the history of ideas that 
offers a diverse range of concepts and classificatory schemes with which to 
interrogate past work. Most important aspects of the discipline’s history 
have been subject to some form of critical analysis. Yet misleading or 
mythical notions of the discipline’s history persist. We were particularly 
perturbed to discover that the ‘First Debate’ concept has been repeatedly 
used as an image of past IR scholarship with little more than a cursory 
reference to the work that the story purports to explain, and despite its 
blatant contravention of a substantial body of critical literature dating back 
to the 1950s. We hope that our investigation into the practice of myth-
making will both illuminate the manner in which IR scholars have indirectly 
contorted history in the service of their present rhetorical intents, and reveal 
how a contextual approach can help us to avoid such mistakes. 
This article is organised into four sections. In the first section we 
summarise recent critical scholarship on the First Debate. This review 
suggests that existing work has yet to analyse the way in which this story 
was incorporated into disciplinary orthodoxy over the last fifty years. The 
second and third sections aim to fill this gap by outlining the manner in 
which an invented fiction became accepted truth. The second section traces 
the construction of the story of a First Debate in IR works published 
between the late 1930s and early 1950s. The third section considers the 
retrospective commentary on this literature. We argue that while early post-
war scholars were responsible for the invention of a realist/idealist 
dichotomy, more recent scholarship is to blame for the ‘myth’ of a First 
Debate. The myth of a First Debate was engendered when various scholars 
sought to portray the intellectual past as an analogue of more recent 
developments in IR theory and in so doing, casually applied a new 
chronology to the idealism/realism contention. In the fourth section we use 
these findings to advocate a contextualist approach to the history of ideas. 
We argue that the myth of a First Debate was developed by scholars who 
perfunctorily used a story about the past to ‘contextualise’ later intellectual 
developments. This strange glitch in the collective understanding of the 
history of ideas could have been avoided if IR theorists had been more 
attentive to the fact that the texts that the story of a First Debate refers to are 
embedded in a specific sequence of historical events. Finally, we conclude 




with some further observations about the limitations of historiographical 
knowledge in contemporary IR. 
THE MYTH OF A FIRST DEBATE: RECENT CRITICAL APPRAISALS 
The story of a First Debate presents the triumph of the realist school over 
the interwar idealists as a catalytic turning point in the history of a nascent 
discipline. Providing a detailed account of the key constitutive ideas of the 
story of a First Debate is a problematic exercise because it has never 
assumed the form of a thoroughly researched, and formally presented 
argument about ideational change. The concept of a ‘First Debate’ is not a 
detailed historical narrative that can be traced to a single authoritative 
source, or group of sources, but rather an ‘anecdote’ that has been briefly 
recounted by a wide variety of authors. Despite these problems, we can 
still identify three contentions about the history of ideas that feature in 
most accounts of this narrative. Scholars recounting the story of a First 
Debate have usually discussed a) an idealist orthodoxy in international 
thought during the interwar years which b) was challenged and defeated 
by a new school of realist thinkers c) during or around the years leading 
up to and including, the Second World War. Sections two and three will 
explain how this story was incorporated into disciplinary orthodoxy. For 
the moment, we will focus on explaining how our account builds upon 
existing critical scholarship dealing with this historical claim. 
Over the last decade a number of authors have problematised various 
elements of the story of a First Debate.4 These critics have collectively 
4  Steve Smith included the story of the Great Debates in his discussion of the ‘self images’ of IR. Ken 
Booth cast suspicion on the First Debate when he discussed one of its constitutive clashes. Ole 
Wæver argued that there had never really been a First Great Debate between idealists and realists. 
See Ken Booth, ‘75 years on: Rewriting the subject’s past – Reinventing its future’, in Ken Booth, 
Steven M. Smith and Marysia Zalewski, eds, International theory: Positivism and beyond 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steven M. Smith, ‘The self-images of a discipline: 
A genealogy of international relations theory’, in Ken Booth and Steven M. Smith, eds, 
International relations theory today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 1; Ole Wæver, ‘The 
sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international 
relations’, International Organization 52(4) 1998. Booth’s work borrowed a great deal from his 
earlier piece which pointed to the ambiguity of E. H. Carr’s distinction between utopianism and 
realism, and questioned the influence of this work in the discipline. Ken Booth, ‘Security in 
anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice’, International Affairs 67(3) 1991. In the last six 
years a number of other authors have contributed to a comprehensive attack on the notion of a First 
Debate. Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Did the realist–idealist great debate really happen? A revisionist 
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substantiated three interrelated, but nevertheless distinguishable, problems 
with disciplinary orthodoxy. They have argued that the story (1) sustains 
misleading conceptions of the past, which reflects (2) a retrospectively 
constructed tradition that in turn (3) disciplines contemporary scholarship. 
Before we outline these points in detail, it is important to account for why 
we have adopted a specific interest in the notion of a ‘First Debate’ in this 
piece, yet neglected some important related issues. Most critical scholarship 
takes issue with the concept of a ‘First Debate’ at the same time as it 
problematises a dominant scheme for understanding the major phases of 
academic international thought, according to which interwar scholarship is 
labelled idealist and post-war scholarship, realist.5 While we acknowledge 
the importance of, on the one hand, challenging existing schemes for 
understanding the evolution of the IR discourse, and on the other, providing 
new narratives for the early period of intellectual development, in this work 
we take an exclusive concern with the First Debate as an empirical claim 
about the discipline’s past, and consider questions about the appropriate 
interpretation of the various phases of intellectual history only insofar as 
they impinge on this primary issue. This exclusive concern is a product of 
our own unique disciplinary bias. We sit within a critical theoretical 
tradition, and are specifically interested with investigations that open up the 
purposive dimension of scholarship to discussion and debate. We have 
history of international relations’, International Relations 16(1) 2002; Brian C. Schmidt, The 
political discourse of anarchy: A disciplinary history of international relations (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1998); Cameron G. Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in 
international relations theory: The case of the idealist–realist debate’, European Journal of 
International Relations 8(2) 2002; Peter Wilson, ‘The myth of the “first great debate”’, Review of 
International Studies 24(5) 1998. 
5  In most of these works the idea that realist and idealist schools faced off in a heated intellectual 
exchange prior to the Second World War is not distinguished from the theory of phases in IR. Smith 
and Schmidt distinguish between the two claims but then treat them as part of the same flawed mythical 
understanding about the discipline. Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy, pp. 22–3; Smith, ‘The 
self-images of a discipline’, pp. 13–14. It is important to recognise that each of these concepts constitute 
very different types of historical claims. Whereas claims about a First Great Debate hypothesise the 
occurrence of a specific ‘event’ in the history of international thought, the periodisation argument posits 
that a certain form of thinking, whether it be a paradigm or school, is an appropriate way of 
characterising a discrete compartment of time. The latter claim refers to the entirety of work in the 
discipline, and therefore has a much higher burden of proof. It also feeds into more general questions 
about the propriety of intellectual periodisation and the theories of intellectual progress or development 
that we use to delineate periodic differences. For an attempt to reconstitute the paradigmatic shift 
occurring during this period see Andreas Osiander, ‘Rereading early twentieth-century IR theory: 
Idealism revisited’, International Studies Quarterly 42(3) 1998.
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focused on the story of a First Debate because it illuminates the historicity 
of contemporary notions of appropriate scholarly purpose.6
The first point of critique raised by recent historiography relates to the 
accuracy of the story of a First Debate. Peter Wilson was the first to develop 
a detailed version of this line of argument. His main critical contentions 
were that an idealist/utopian ‘school’ never existed, a ‘debate’ never 
occurred, and realism did not emerge from this period victorious. According 
to Wilson, the ‘idealist/utopian’ label is better understood as a construct 
developed by E. H. Carr for the purpose of polemic.7 Carr used the term 
‘utopian’ to refer to a broad category of thinkers that stretched so wide as to 
be untenable as a school of like-minded scholars.8 Unsurprisingly, none of 
Carr’s contemporaries accepted the label of ‘utopian’ thinker. Perhaps more 
importantly, Carr himself was not decisive regarding the relative merits of 
realism and utopianism.9 He presented international thought as a dialectic in 
which elements of, and an equilibrium between, both realism and 
utopianism were necessary for successful policy. While Wilson documented 
a number of critical responses to Carr’s work, he also noted that Carr never 
6  Gerard Holden has recently argued that all scholars who engage in the exercise of (re)interpreting their 
intellectual past must be explicit regarding the origin and limitations of their own perspective. His work 
also outlines the purposive dimension of the critical tradition in IR. Gerard Holden, ‘Who 
contextualizes the contextualizers? Disciplinary history and the discourse about IR discourse’, Review 
of International Studies 28(2) 2002. A range of work within a broad critical–theoretical tradition has 
interrogated the purposive nature of critical theory. Andrew Linklater has offered a version of this work 
that sustains an independent role for normative reflection while Christian Heine and Benno Teschke 
have argued in favour of a materialist notion of purpose. Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, ‘On 
dialectic and international relations: A reply to our critics’, Millennium 26(2) 1997; Christian Heine and 
Benno Teschke, ‘Sleeping Beauty and the dialectical awakening: On the potential of dialectic for 
international relations’, Millennium 25(2) 1996; Andrew Linklater, ‘The problem of community in 
international relations’, Alternatives 15(2) 1990; Andrew Linklater, ‘The question of the next stage in 
international relations theory: A critical–theoretical point of view’, Millennium 21(1) 1992; Andrew 
Linklater, The transformation of political community: Ethical foundations of the post-Westphalian era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
7  Wilson, ‘The myth of the “first great debate”’, pp. 10–12.
8  Peter Wilson and David Long’s edited volume provides texture and meaning to the work of interwar 
idealists. Their work offers an impressive collection of essays devoted to recovering the ideas of this 
group of scholars that have so often been casually dismissed. David Long and Peter Wilson, eds, 
Thinkers of the twenty years’ crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995).
9  See Booth, ‘Security in anarchy’.
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issued a rejoinder to these critiques.10 Although he appears to have used 
these criticisms in his subsequent work, there was never any major 
interlocutory ‘debate’. Finally, while Carr’s targets regarded their assailant 
as a scholar of great merit, and his book The twenty years’ crisis11 as a 
significant work, they appear to have been unperturbed by his realist 
‘onslaught’.12 Carr’s critique did not dishearten a group of scholars, 
convince them of a new way forward, or make them pack up and go home.  
The concept of a ‘First Debate’ is best regarded as a ‘half-truth’, rather 
than a complete fiction.13 Wilson labelled the First Debate a ‘myth’ because 
his research exploded the popular notion that an argument between realist 
and idealist schools had dominated international thought in the interwar 
years. However, even as Wilson emphasised the flaws in this story he also, 
somewhat paradoxically, helped to establish the First Debate as a partially 
valid tale. His work proved that The twenty years’ crisis had indeed sparked 
a controversy, and had also led to a volley of responses from some of the 
scholars that he had associated (albeit inappropriately) with utopian thought. 
Since none of the scholars who have endorsed the story of a First Debate 
have provided any detailed research to support it, Wilson’s work provided 
the strongest case to date for considering the First Debate to be a valid 
account of past work in the discipline.  
Lucian Ashworth has recently expanded upon the notion of the First 
Debate as a partial truth. While his work reiterated Wilson’s argument that 
the association between the First Debate and the interwar years is highly 
inappropriate, he also identified the two separate points at which a 
contention between realism and idealism could be said to have existed in the 
interwar years, and conceded that a controversy vaguely replicating the 
10  Peter Wilson, ‘Carr and his early critics: Responses to the twenty years’ crisis, 1939–46’, in Michael 
Cox, ed., E. H. Carr: A critical reappraisal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Wilson, ‘The myth 
of the “first great debate”’, pp. 2–6.
11  Edward Hallett Carr, The twenty years’ crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the study of international 
relations (London: Macmillan, 1939).
12  Schmidt notes that the post-war generation of scholars identifying themselves as realists continued to 
share a great deal with scholarship of the interwar years. Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy, 
chapter 6.
13  Booth advanced the notion of considering the debate a half-truth in his discussion of a particularly 
famous, albeit unpublished, episode of the ‘First Debate’, that is, the Carr versus David Davies dispute 
at Aberystwyth. Booth, ‘75 years on’, p. 328.
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realist/idealist divide occurred ‘within’ the realist camp in the post-Second 
World War era.14 Given this conditional acceptance of the concept of a 
realist/idealist controversy, we contend that the story ought to be regarded as 
mythical in the sense that it refers to a real set of academic events and texts 
while both exaggerating the usefulness of the realist/idealist dichotomy as a 
classificatory device for intellectual history, and misrepresenting the 
chronology of the events that it purports to explain. In our work we build 
upon this notion of the First Debate as a ‘half-truth’ and identify the way in 
which historical errors have been incorporated into disciplinary orthodoxy. 
The second critique is that the First Debate is not an accurate account of 
the tradition of IR. Ole Wæver claimed that the story was produced via the 
post hoc self congratulatory ruminations of realists when they came to 
dominate the discipline of IR in the post-war era.15 The works of Ashworth 
and Cameron Thies have fleshed out this claim, and explored the way post-
war scholars constructed the idea of a debate in service of their own 
interests.16 Thies’ work, in turn, relied upon an earlier critique by Brian 
Schmidt which distinguished between two types of tradition, ‘historical’ and 
‘analytical’.17 According to Schmidt, an ‘analytical’ tradition is a retroactively 
developed concept that is imposed upon the past by individuals who are 
primarily concerned with contemporary issues. This form of tradition ‘is an 
intellectual construction in which a scholar may stipulate certain ideas, 
themes, genres, or texts as functionally similar. It is, most essentially, a retro-
spectively created construct determined by present criteria and concerns’.18
In contrast, an ‘historical’ tradition accords with the common sense 
understanding of the term, as a cultural phenomenon that is handed down 
14  Ashworth, ‘Did the realist–idealist great debate really happen?’ 
15  Ole Wæver, ‘Figures of international thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms’, in Iver B. 
Neumann and Ole Wæver, eds, The future of international relations: Masters in the making? (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 9–10.
16  Ashworth, ‘Did the realist–idealist great debate really happen?’; Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in 
international relations theory’.
17  Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy. This distinction is drawn from John Gunnell’s work. John 
G. Gunnell, Between philosophy and politics: The alienation of political theory (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1986); John G. Gunnell, Political theory: Tradition and interpretation (Latham: 
University Press of America, 1979).
18  Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy, p. 25.
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from one generation to the next. This form of tradition may be defined as 
‘… a preconstituted and self constituted pattern of conventional practice 
through which ideas are conveyed within a recognizably established and 
specified discursive framework’.19 One of the most significant problems 
with knowledge of the history of ideas in contemporary IR is that we tend to 
confuse analytical traditions like the story of a First Debate, with the 
historical traditions that we inherit. Schmidt’s argument rests on the claim 
that IR scholarship is constituted by an enduring set of conventional 
practices and ideas that can be defined and accurately characterised. His 
work took up the task of detecting and narrating the history of the American 
tradition of IR during the years that the story of a First Debate puports to 
explain. 
The third challenge to the story of a First Debate has been directed at its 
disciplining role in IR discourse over subsequent years.20 Critical scholars 
have made note of the way in which the story has shaped the actions and 
outlooks of subsequent generations of IR scholars.21 Steve Smith contended 
that the idea of a sequence of Great Debates has helped to validate new 
orthodoxies by awarding ‘a winner’s medal to the dominant voice’.22 
Wæver concurred with this characterisation, briefly noting that the accep-
tance of the notion of a First Debate has meant that ‘[p]ositions critical of 
realism could be dismissed as reincarnations of interwar idealism’.23 Wilson 
has provided the most detailed version of this critique. According to his 
work, the scholarship of the interwar years can be best characterised in 
terms of a distinctive linkage between scholarship and progress: ‘... if there 
is anything which binds these views and beliefs together into what remotely 
might be called a paradigm or a school of thought it is the assumption that 
19  Ibid.
20  Booth contended that this set of half-truths had helped to ‘discipline the discipline’. Booth, ‘75 years 
on’, p. 328.
21  Although there is ultimately no way in which one can gauge the ‘degree’ to which contemporary 
scholars believe in this story, the critics all assert or imply that acceptance of this concept is widespread. 
Ashworth has offered the strongest version of this claim: ‘[i]n the history of international relations, no 
single idea has been more influential than the notion that there was a “great debate” in the 1920s and 
1930s’. Ashworth, ‘Did the realist–idealist great debate really happen?’, p. 33.
22  Smith, ‘The self-images of a discipline’, p. 16.
23  Wæver, ‘Figures of international thought’, p. 10.
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conscious, progressive change is possible in international relations’.24 In this 
reading, the myth effectively taboos progressive approaches by linking them 
with idealism, a school that has been widely associated with various forms 
of ‘woolly’ thought:  
... because of the loaded nature of the terms ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, 
purposeful, progressive change automatically becomes associated with 
unworldliness, impracticality, and untruth (and fatalism, international stasis, 
human impotence, with worldliness, practicality, and truth).25  
Hence, the myth is not only responsible for the ossification of two major 
traditions of international thought, it should also take some of the blame 
for the paucity of progressive scholarship in the discipline. 
Wilson’s critical point is suggestive of, but does not adequately flesh out, 
an important argument about the role of a First Debate in the construction of 
disciplinary orthodoxy. It suggests that the form of the story has changed 
over time. Somewhere along the way, the analytical construct that had been 
developed to categorise past work and legitimate more recent literature, has 
been transformed into a core feature of disciplinary orthodoxy, that is, a set 
of practices, concepts and beliefs handed down from one generation to the 
next.26 One way of expressing this would be to say that while this story may 
have begun as what Schmidt identified as an analytical tradition, it is now a 
core component of our inherited, historical tradition. Unfortunately, Schmidt 
himself is reluctant to acknowledge that such a transition has occurred.27 He 
24  Wilson, ‘The myth of the “first great debate”’, p. 9.
25  Ibid., p. 10.
26  Wæver makes note of this dual role of the concept but treats it as a consistent feature of historical 
images rather than a process of historical change:  
[t]he ‘debates’ operate as a dialectic between implicit pictures and articulate self-representations 
of the discipline. In part, they are implicit operators in (and thereby shape) actual academic 
practice, in part they are constructed and artificially imposed upon much more diverse activities. 
In the second capacity they are selective readings amplifying the elements that fit into their story. 
But in the first, they are distinctions involved in the work of the discipline (and thus real and 
effective) (Wæver, ‘Figures of international thought’, p. 9). 
27  Wæver made note of this shortfall in Schmidt’s work: ‘… he does not explore why and with what 
effects this myth has been established and thus misses how it has become socially real, even if it is 
historically false’. Wæver, ‘The sociology of a not so international discipline’, p. 692. 
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maintains that the First Debate is an analytical construct, and that it is an 
error to confuse it with our inherited conventions.28
In his more recent article Thies presents an account of the transition from 
analytical construct to historical tradition. He argued that post-war realists 
were responsible for contorting interwar scholarship into the imaginary 
school that we now recognise as idealism, and for presenting this artifice as 
the antithesis of a unified realist school. Realists abstracted ‘world 
federalism’ and the ‘anarchy/sovereignty’ dichotomy from the many strands 
of academic international thought during the interwar years, and 
inappropriately presented these themes as the defining interests of two 
contraposed traditions of IR scholarship, idealism and realism. According to 
Thies, they did so in order to establish their paradigm as dominant, and to 
represent it as progressive.29 Thies also suggests that this move was made in 
two stages, by two different groups of early realists: utopian realists and 
modern realists.30 Both groups are implicated in the process of constructing 
the First Debate, and in the final analysis both acknowledge that power 
politics is the definitive principle of the ‘real’ in international relations. 
However, they differ in the extent to which they utilise idealist thinking in 
their own work. Carr, John Herz and Quincy Wright are counted amongst 
the utopian realists for their recognition of the place of an idealism 
alongside realism in international relations theory.31 The early signs of a less 
conciliatory, modern realism are said to be found in the works of Hans 
Morgenthau, William Fox and Arnold Wolfers who heap scorn upon a 
hypothetical idealist paradigm.32
28  Schmidt holds this line despite the fact that he considers belief in the ‘First Debate’ concept to be the 
most common assumption in IR historiography:  
[t]here is no more commonly accepted assumption about the history of academic international 
relations than that the field experienced an intellectual controversy in the late 1930s and early 
1940s that pitted the scholars of the interwar period and their predecessors against a distinctively 
new group of scholars who were conspicuous by their advocacy of a ‘realist’ approach … The 
controversy between the ‘idealists’ and the ‘realists’ has been accepted as marking the field’s first 
‘great debate’ (Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy, p. 191). 
29  Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in international relations theory’, pp. 148–9. 
30  Ibid., p. 162. 
31  Ibid., pp. 162–5. 
32  Ibid., pp. 165–7. 
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Thies used these findings to dispute Wilson’s claim that the First Debate 
is responsible for a paucity of progressive work in the discipline.33 While 
the First Debate has had a defining impact upon the broader IR discipline, 
post-war realists were ultimately unsuccessful in their disciplinary agenda, 
because they made serious historical errors, particularly with regard to the 
notion of a unified idealist interwar paradigm. Hence, shades of an idealist/ 
realist debate continue to resurface in the discipline. Thies argued that the 
persistence of unacknowledged goals in realist theory, and the recurrence of 
the tensions between idealism and realism in the neorealist–neoliberal 
debate was evidence of the failure of the First Debate concept to garner 
acceptance for the modern realist version of the past.34
Thies is yet to fully substantiate his argument because his analysis of the 
development of the First Debate concept remains somewhat incomplete. 
Having identified early signs of a modern realist identity in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, he concluded his study of this construct.35 Our findings 
suggest a set of conclusions that differ from those of both Wilson and Thies. 
First, while our analysis concurs with Wilson’s claim that the First Debate 
has been partially responsible for the paucity of progressive work in the 
discipline, we do not believe that this was the result of the mistaken 
branding of interwar scholarship as idealist. Instead, we contend that the 
tendency of more recent authors to ignore or misconstrue the connection 
between contextual factors and theory in their historical accounts has shut 
them off from the public policy component of IR scholarship produced in 
the years surrounding the Second World War. Second, while we agree with 
Thies’ argument that post-war scholars were largely responsible for con-
structing the debating concept, we disagree with his decision to discuss the 
perpetuation and reconstruction of this myth purely in terms of the 
preservation of a realist paradigm. Our argument emphasises the use of this 
myth in the construction of a unique disciplinary identity based upon the 
notion of an intra-disciplinary academic purpose. 
33  Ibid., p. 173. 
34  Ibid., p. 170. 
35  Thies acknowledged that ‘[a] more careful examination of the writings of modern realists with regard to 
“idealism” is an area of future research that should eventually flesh out this argument’. Ibid., p. 174. We 
take this as grounds to believe that he is currently working on a more detailed account of the role of the 
First Debate in the construction of realist identity. 




Our diagnostic account of the construction of the ‘First Debate’ also 
suggests a remedy for the problems associated with the construction of 
analytical traditions in the field. Existing critical scholarship has tended to 
respond to these issues with an inherent scepticism for dominant narratives, 
and have reacted by making the elaboration of accurate historiographical 
accounts an empirical imperative of their work. This position is epitomised 
by both Schmidt and Thies, who seek to overcome particular flaws in 
contemporary understanding through detailed analysis of past texts. Their 
accounts, and other attempts to rewrite the disciplinary conversations that 
have constituted IR discourse, have provided scholars with new ways of 
understanding their intellectual history. However, what is lacking in many 
of these approaches is a methodological imperative to incorporate con-
textual factors into historiographical analysis.36 This is a side of interpretive 
method that scholars like Schmidt and Thies, who adopt an ‘internal’ 
discursive method of analysis avoid at their peril. As we suggested earlier, 
the main flaw with the contemporary representations of the realist/idealist 
‘debate’ is the inappropriate chronology that has been attached to this axis 
of discussion. Yet, Thies’ attempt to explain the development of the concept 
of a First Debate using an exclusively internal method, also lacks a clear 
chronology.37 As a result, his argument about the transition between utopian 
36  Holden has argued that ‘internal’ historians have misinterpreted the significance of Quentin Skinner’s 
contextualist methodology. Holden, ‘Who contextualizes the contextualizers?’ For good examples of 
Skinner’s methodological arguments see James Tully, ed., Meaning and context: Quentin Skinner and 
his critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). For a good example of Skinner’s use of this method in an 
empirical project see Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978). Thies does not explicitly exclude the merits of a contextualist 
approach. He only eschews the need to employ one with the somewhat obtuse claim that context both 
‘mutes’ and ‘amplifies’ internal factors. He also argues against the significance of context in his 
conclusion by contending that ‘the argument that contextual factors completely determine 
interdisciplinary conceptual and theoretical shifts seems weak’. Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in 
international relations theory’, p. 171. As Holden has already shown, such claims about causality do not 
challenge the validity of Skinner’s contextual method. 
37  At one point in his argument Thies appears to excuse himself from the need to obey the constraints of 
chronology by arguing that time itself is a social construct. He uses John Gerard Ruggie’s work on the 
concept of ‘social time’ to sanction this particular approach. As Stephen Krasner’s critique of Ruggie’s 
attempts to periodise the modern state system make clear, Ruggie’s elastic notions of social time have 
been connected to some debatable contentions about the history of ideas. Stephen D. Krasner, 
‘Westphalia and all that’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds, Ideas and foreign policy: 
Beliefs, institutions, and political change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); John Gerard Ruggie, 
‘Social time and environmental policy: Conceptualizing global population and resource issues’, in 
Margaret P. Karns, ed., Persistent patterns and emergent structures in a waning century (New York: 
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realism and modern realism loses much of its historical weight. For 
example, Thies presents Wright as the primary ‘precursor’ to modern 
realism, despite the fact that this work was published several years after the 
only example of modern realism that Thies identified. Hence, it is difficult 
to see how utopian realism can be an historical precursor of any realist 
identity-making project. The other main flaw that existing critics have 
identified with respect to the First Debate is that it is a jaundiced perspective 
on history. Thies’ work also remains open to this same problem. Most of the 
authors responsible for developing the notion of an idealist/realist divide in 
the post-war era discussed this concept as a classificatory scheme for 
understanding contemporary events. Yet Thies’ account of the use of the 
idealist/realist dichotomy in the post-Second World War era argues that 
these works are primarily focused on the retroactive construction of the 
past. Hence, it is debatable whether the very critique that Thies and others 
have levelled against the realists, i.e., that of writing history to conform with 
a specific disciplinary agenda, also applies to his ‘critical’ agenda, in this 
case, that of displacing realism.38 In this work we explain how a con-
textualist approach helps historians of ideas to avoid these two interpretive 
traps by forcing scholars to acknowledge an appropriate chronology of 
ideational change, and making them aware of the historicity of their own 
understanding of disciplinary purpose. 
THE AUTHORS OF A FIRST DEBATE: ORIGINS OF A REALIST/ 
IDEALIST DIVIDE 
Our account of the development of the story of a First Debate is 
necessarily limited. At a general level, we acknowledge that a final or 
‘true’ interpretation of the history of ideas is both unrealistic and 
Praeger, 1986); John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing modernity in 
international relations’, International Organization 47(1) 1993. 
38  Holden has also noted that the failure to acknowledge the purposive dimension of their own work has 
been a generic shortcoming of scholars adopting an ‘internal’ disciplinary approach. In this view, such 
scholars succumb to the temptation of presenting their own accounts as above or beyond, rather than 
embedded within a unique historical perspective. They fail to identify the fact that their own 
representation of history is the product of a particular, historically contingent world view. Holden, 
‘Who contextualizes the contextualizers?’ Given that Schmidt does not explicitly concern himself with 
the transition between analytical and historical tradition we do not deal with his argument in this piece. 
Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy. 
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unobtainable.39 However, we also recognise that academic tradition, our 
chosen subject matter, presents its own sorts of empirical problems. Our 
brief genealogy of this myth is dependent upon those instances where the 
story of the First Debate has been documented in key IR journals and 
texts. Although this published material is a prominent, accessible source 
of disciplinary lore, we suspect that this account only captures a portion of 
the process of myth-making and story-telling that we seek to understand. 
Tradition is often passed down through hearsay, gossip and speculation: in 
offhand statements made between colleagues; in perfunctory references 
during seminars and conferences; and in didactic generalisations delivered 
in lecture halls. It is highly likely that the construction and ritual repro-
duction of this story has partially taken place in non-published, and 
therefore, largely inaccessible, academic discourse. 
Carr serves as the starting point of our analysis because his book The 
twenty years’ crisis is widely acknowledged as the first major work to 
popularise the notion of a conflict between realism and utopianism.40 Carr 
believed that this theoretical dichotomy was the product of ‘natural’ 
developments in an immature discipline.41 The nascent ‘science of inter-
national politics’ had been formulated in response to the demand for greater 
public understanding of international affairs after the First World War. Carr 
argued that the antagonism between utopianism and realism in the study of 
IR was a necessary stage in the maturing of a scholarly tradition.42 The 
broader social purposes that had instigated this form of study, and in 
particular, the desire for international peace emerging out of the Great War, 
had been particularly influential in the early years of academic IR. Scholars 
had devoted themselves to the construction of visionary projects designed to 
39  Skinner has compellingly argued that it is futile to attempt to produce a conclusive story of this kind: 
‘We must certainly be careful to avoid the vulgarity ... of supposing that we can ever hope to arrive at 
“the correct reading” of a text, such that we may speak of having finally determined its meaning and 
thereby ruled out alternative interpretations.’ Quentin Skinner, ‘Motives, intentions and the 
interpretation of texts’, in Tully, ed., Meaning and context, p. 68. 
40  Of course, Carr’s work did not ‘invent’ the notion of an antagonism between realism and idealism. 
Thies has recently noted that Herbert Spencer made use of a contrast between idealism and realism. 
H. R. Spencer, ‘International politics and history’, American Political Science Review 17, 1923; Thies, 
‘Progress, history and identity in international relations theory’, p. 157. 
41  Carr, The twenty years’ crisis, p. 3. 
42  Ibid., pp. 7–13. 
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address the dilemmas of international conflict. Carr believed that the ten-
dency to construct scientific endeavour in service of such ends had fostered 
an utopian imbalance in their work. Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Toynbee and 
Norman Angell, contributors to a burgeoning literature on international 
affairs in these decades, were all criticised on these grounds.43 He ques-
tioned their shared belief that the conflictual tendencies of interstate 
relations were the result of a certain form of ‘wrong thinking’, whether it be 
wickedness or mere ignorance, and the subsequent contention that inter-
national politics could be reformed through the correction of such mistaken 
views. His work showed, amongst other things, that the problems that these 
scholars had sought to define were the product of an inescapable reality of 
international politics, the conflict of interests amongst states. 
Carr’s polemic against utopian extremism was not simply, and indeed not 
primarily, directed at his colleagues. He attacked a broader set of Anglo-
American thinkers. The work branded a range of authors and practitioners 
with the label ‘utopian’, including both the supposed intellectual progenitors 
of the utopian tradition, such as eighteenth century liberal economic 
theorists like Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, as well as 
practitioners held to be responsible for utopian foreign policy mistakes, like 
Lord Cecil and, more regularly, Woodrow Wilson.44 Carr appears to have 
been particularly keen to convince this last group of thinkers, who operated 
in the broader policy realm. According to his brief history of ideas, the 
utopian orthodoxy in Allied foreign policy making had been slammed up 
against the brutal coalface of ‘reality’ during the 1930s. Events like the 
Manchurian Crisis and Hitler’s ‘annexation’ of Austria had forced many to 
contemplate a more pragmatic realist approach. Carr preached the virtues of 
a balance between utopian and realist thinking so that future proponents of 
principled pacifism would not be similarly disillusioned. He dedicated The 
twenty years’ crisis, including his detailed exposition of a realist approach, 
‘to the makers of the coming peace’, in the hope that utopian extremism 
43  Ibid., pp. 31, 35, 56. 
44  Ibid., pp. 48–53. 
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would not bedevil the construction of solutions to an incipient post-war 
problematic.45
The twenty years’ crisis was a widely read publication that naturally won 
the critical attention of Carr’s contemporaries. Over the next few years, a 
range of critics and reviewers published responses to his work.46 Carr’s 
opponents were unconvinced that the realist approach sustained an appro-
priate framework for dealing with practical questions of the day, or those of 
the recent past. In particular, his support for a policy of appeasement came 
up for attack. Leonard Woolf was amazed at the fact that Carr could dismiss 
the League of Nations as fanciful because it was formulated through 
abstract principles, at the same time as he sanctioned an appeasement policy 
that had been proven by hard reality to be palpably wrong.47 William 
Maddox noted that Carr’s appeasement prescription did not specify the 
degree of concessions that should be made to a rising power, or show 
whether a new hegemon would acquire a moral attitude.48 While Richard 
Coventry expressed whole-hearted support for Carr’s radical wake-up call 
to the ‘airy’ thinking in foreign policy circles on both the Left and the Right, 
he also took issue with Carr’s supposedly ‘realistic’ sanction of an 
appeasement policy.49
The main reason that Carr’s critics felt compelled to publish their dis-
agreements was their fear that Carr’s philosophy was becoming increasingly 
popular. Norman Angell, a scholar who had won notoriety for his attempts 
to dispel the popular illusion that nations could gain through war and 
conquest, was one of the first to enter the fray. Interestingly Angell, a 
reputed pacifist, wrote in fear of what he saw as Carr’s disparagement of the 
45  A decade later Morgenthau argued that Carr’s contributions to international politics had to be read 
against the errors of policy makers in Great Britain and the United States. Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The 
political science of E. H. Carr’, World Politics 1(1) 1948. 
46  Norman Angell, Why freedom matters (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1940); Richard Coventry, ‘The 
illusions of power’, New Statesman 28(457) 1939; Friedrich A. von Hayek, The road to serfdom 
(London: G. Routledge, 1944); William P. Maddox, ‘Twenty years’ crisis’, American Political Science 
Review 34(3) 1940; Leonard Woolf, ‘Utopia and reality’, Political Quarterly 11(2) 1940. 
47  Woolf, ‘Utopia and reality’. Woolf’s book on the subject challenged Carr to prove whether a political 
framework based upon a conflict of interests would be superior to one conceived around the concept of 
a harmony of interests. Leonard Woolf, The war for peace (London: Labour Book Service, 1940). 
48  Maddox, ‘Twenty years’ crisis’. 
49  Coventry, ‘The illusions of power’, p. 762. 
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principles behind the British war effort. Angell was particularly disturbed by 
Carr’s work because, as Director of the Foreign Division of the Ministry of 
Information, Carr was responsible for the formulation and publication of the 
British case for war, and was in a position to popularise his ‘defeatist’ views 
abroad. He labelled Carr, along with a list of other prominent figures in 
British policy making circles, as an ‘intellectual ally of Hitler’ for suggest-
ing that the British had not been acting in pursuit of a generalisable set of 
moral concerns.50 Friedrich Hayek was similarly worried by the linkages 
between Carr and the German cause. He believed that Carr was represent-
ative of a new totalitarian, and characteristically German way of thinking 
about politics that had become prevalent in British policy circles. He 
attacked Carr in order to defend the liberal tradition which, in his words, 
‘used to be the common basis of most English politics’.51 Woolf veered 
away from the emotive German analogy, but nevertheless belittled Carr’s 
form of thinking as an instance of a morose ‘temporary social psychology’ 
of the time.52 He believed that Carr’s work was dangerous because it 
provided an academic veneer for the widespread wartime sense that conflict 
in the international realm was endemic.53  
Both Wilson and Schmidt have persuasively argued that Carr’s disagree-
ments with his colleagues cannot be plausibly considered a ‘Great 
Debate’.54 However, Ashworth and Thies have shown that the interwar and 
wartime period was not the primary source of the story of a First Debate.55 
This construct was primarily developed in a set of works published after 
Carr appeared to lose interest in the conceptual framework he had 
developed. In the late 1940s a similar dichotomy to that outlined in The 
twenty years’ crisis became a significant axis of discussion and debate 
amongst an emerging group of IR scholars in the United States of America. 
50  Angell, Why freedom matters, pp. 42–5. 
51  Hayek, The road to serfdom, p. 135. 
52  Woolf, ‘Utopia and reality’, p. 173. 
53  Ibid., pp. 181–2. 
54  Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy; Wilson, ‘The myth of the “first great debate”’. 
55  Ashworth, ‘Did the realist–idealist great debate really happen?’; Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in 
international relations theory’. 
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In a forum entitled ‘The National Interest and Moral Principles in 
Foreign Policy’, Morgenthau took the side of the national interest against 
Fox’s case for a moralistic approach. While their disagreements appear to 
have been situated around a realist, anti-realist divide, neither author raised 
the notion of a distinction between idealism/utopianism and realism in 
international thought.56 Two years later Morgenthau reiterated much of 
Carr’s wartime critique of the Western utopian tradition in the provocative 
In defense of the national interest, which explicitly took issue with utopian 
forms of foreign policy.57 As with Carr, Morgenthau believed that the major 
challenge confronting policy makers was not simply the nature of con-
temporary politics, but the ingrained traditions of thought in their respective 
nations. Morgenthau contended that over the past fifty years a utopian brand 
of thinking, epitomised by Woodrow Wilson, had been responsible for the 
neglect of the vital concept of the US national interest. To make matters 
worse, Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman continued to 
espouse these utopian illusions in their attempts to construct a post-war 
international order.58
For the most part, post-war scholars chose an alternative, less derogatory 
anti-realist moniker than the label ‘utopianism’. Various authors began to 
refer to ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ as alternative, and competing, philosophies 
56  William T. R. Fox, ‘The reconciliation of the desirable and the possible’, The American Scholar 18(2) 
1949; Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The primacy of the national interest’, The American Scholar 18(2) 1949. 
Thies includes a piece by Fox published the same year amongst his list of modern realists. We have not 
included this piece here because, despite the fact that Fox scripts the eras of IR in a way that most 
scholars have been critical of, he makes no reference to an idealist school, or to the concept of a 
‘debate’. Also, as we later point out, his later article with Annette Fox explicitly challenges the notion of 
a ‘Great Debate’. William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, ‘The teaching of international relations in 
the United States’, World Politics 13(3) 1961. 
57  Hans J. Morgenthau, In defense of the national interest: A critical examination of American foreign 
policy (New York: Knopf, 1951), chapters 1, 4. 
58  Despite the fact that Morgenthau’s academic work was devoted to explaining the primacy of the 
national interest over moral principles, he did not categorically associate his work with an amoral 
version of IR. Morgenthau criticised Carr’s attempts to marry utopian and realist thinking in his 
publications since 1939. Interestingly, Morgenthau did not believe that this was an impossible marriage, 
but that Carr had simply failed to establish a transcendent standard of ethics from which he could judge 
changes in the balance of power. As with the earlier critics of The twenty years’ crisis, Morgenthau 
believed that the main problem with Carr’s work was that it was an inappropriate form of advice to be 
giving to Western leaders. He concluded his critique with the pithy warning: ‘[i]t is a dangerous thing to 
be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without virtù’. Morgenthau, ‘The political 
science of E. H. Carr’, p. 134. 
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of American foreign policy. The notion that a controversy between realism 
and idealism constituted a ‘Great Debate’ was first raised in a published 
debate between Morgenthau and Frank Tannenbaum. Tannenbaum’s article 
presented the dispute as an argument between Morgenthau’s work on the 
balance of power and his neo-federalist concept of a ‘coördinate state’. 
Tannenbaum developed a similar anti-realist position to that advocated by 
several of Carr’s critics in the early 1940s. The problem with the realist 
school was that it sought to dissolve the foundations of ‘what has always 
been the American philosophy of international relations’.59  
Tannenbaum’s article, and Morgenthau’s reply of the same year, both 
dubbed their dispute a ‘Great Debate’. For Tannenbaum, this controversy 
was ‘great’ because the moral purpose of American internationalism was at 
stake, and this debate would help to determine its future.60 In contrast to the 
long standing argument between ‘interventionists’ and ‘isolationists’, this 
new struggle threatened to transform the foundations of the American 
foreign policy tradition. In contrast, Morgenthau believed that the new 
debate was a peculiar event because it had established philosophical rather 
than policy prescriptive camps. In previous debates participants had had a 
choice between two separate policy options: intervention versus expansion 
debates in 1793; expansion versus the status quo during the Mexican War; 
international cooperation versus isolation in the 1920s; and intervention 
versus abstention in the late 1930s. No equivalent choices existed in the 
1950s foreign policy dispute. Neither side of the ‘utopian versus realism’ 
schism corralled around a clear policy prescription; they were divided 
according to their commitment to particular schools of thought.61
While Morgenthau and Tannenbaum’s discussion suggests that there was 
a significant controversy in international thought during these years, the 
primary aim of this new group of scholars was usually to discover an 
appropriate balance between opposing philosophical positions on foreign 
policy matters. Reinhold Niebuhr complained about the polarisation of 
59  Frank Tannenbaum, ‘The balance of power versus the coordinate state’, Political Science Quarterly 
67(2) 1952, p. 175. 
60  Ibid., pp. 174–5. 
61  Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another “great debate”: The national interest of the United States’, American 
Political Science Review 46(4) 1952, p. 961. 
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international relations thought between idealists and realists. While the 
majority of his article lambasted the idealist side, his main argument was 
that both forms of thinking were a necessary component of a coherent 
foreign policy approach, and he set out to discover an alternative third 
way.62 Arnold Wolfers noted that the current dispute between idealist and 
realist schools had reformulated a persistent philosophical struggle within 
modern scholarship. This piece made a more concerted effort to chart a 
course between the theoretical poles of idealism and realism by establishing 
a ‘realistic theory of peace strategy’. The main purpose of his work was to 
‘discover policies and practices which offer most promise of turning nations 
away from goals that point toward power competition and violence’.63 John 
Herz provided the most comprehensive account of the two strands of 
international thought. After having been convinced that the general feeling 
of optimism in the early years after the Second World War required a dose 
of realist thinking, Herz noted that the demand for his detailed comparison 
of these two traditions now sprung from the need for more liberal principles 
to balance out the prevalence of power political thinking in both policy 
making and public opinion circles.64
Quincy Wright’s review of Herz’s work agreed that both a realistic 
idealism and an idealistic realism was required. However, he challenged 
Herz’s usage of the terms ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ as monikers for 
alternative philosophical positions in international relations. He argued that 
Herz’s work suffered ‘from an effort to treat practical problems in terms of 
absolute categories’ and that Herz had only succeeded in demonstrating 
‘that the distinction between “realism” and “idealism” is of doubtful value 
in either political analysis or political philosophy’.65 Piotyr Wandycz 
62  Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘A protest against a dilemma’s two horns’, World Politics 2(3) 1950. 
63  Arnold Wolfers, ‘The pole of power and the pole of indifference’, World Politics 4(1) 1951, p. 63. 
64  John H. Herz, Political realism and political idealism: A study in theories and realities (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. v. 
65  Quincy Wright, ‘Realism and idealism in international politics’, World Politics 5(1) 1952, p. 119. 
Wright’s later work, which Thies cites as a utopian realist text, and therefore, the precursor of modern 
realism, explores these issues in greater detail, by attempting to provide an understanding of what is 
‘real’ and what is ‘ideal’ that is based upon the use of these concepts in a broader tradition of Western 
philosophy. In this work he challenged the pejorative use of the terms ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. Thies, 
‘Progress, history and identity in international relations theory’, p. 152; Quincy Wright, The study of 
international relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 9–15. 
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reiterated these suspicions a couple of years later. He noted that the divide 
between realism and idealism was a ‘fashionable’ way of discussing 
international thought and opposed this dichotomous view of international 
relations on the grounds that it tended to polarise work that rarely fit neatly 
into either of these categories.66 He argued that the works of Carr and 
Morgenthau ought to be seen as an attempt to discuss the ‘relationship 
between theory and practice, idealism and realism’.67
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MYTH: RETROSPECTIVE 
STORYTELLERS 
In this section we move beyond the work of scholars using the idealist/ 
realist dichotomy as a device for discussing contemporary theory, to focus 
on scholars who have explicitly, or self-consciously, referred to a 
‘historical’ dispute. Dwight Waldo published the first retrospective look at 
the concept of an early Great Debate.68 Having documented the shift 
between idealism and realism, which occurred over the interwar years, 
Waldo spoke of this dyad as a defining feature of the debate over the 
national interest. He cited Morgenthau’s 1952 article as a principal con-
tribution to this intellectual controversy. However, Waldo was more 
circumspect than Morgenthau on the issue of whether the lines were 
clearly drawn between the two brands of thinking. He argued that the ‘so-
called’ idealists were a particularly difficult bunch of theorists to identify. 
More importantly, he specifically differentiated between the anti-realists 
in the post-war years from the idealist scholars of the interwar years:  
[t]hose who have taken the idealist position in the debates are not persons 
who were leaders of institutionalist-legalist studies in the interwar years, 
but (on the whole) younger scholars who themselves represent newer 
currents of thought and activity.69
At the end of the decade, Robert Good argued that while the self-
proclaimed ‘realists’ had been united in their opposition to idealist 
66  Piotr S. Wandycz, ‘The theory of international relations’, Review of Politics 17(2) 1955, p. 193. 
67  Ibid., p. 191. 
68  Dwight Waldo, Political science in the United States of America: A trend report (Paris: UNESCO, 
1955), pp. 60–1. 
69  Ibid., p. 60. 
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‘illusions’, this dichotomous view of international thought revealed a great 
deal more about differences within realism. His article put Morgenthau and 
George Kennan’s ‘relativist’ and ‘transcendental’ ethics into a hypothetical 
‘debate’ with Niebuhr’s ‘superior’ position of a ‘dialectic’ between ‘love 
and self-love’.70 In 1961 William Fox and Annette Fox expanded on 
Waldo’s earlier suspicions about the ‘Great Debate’ by questioning its 
significance in the historical development of the field. They argued that the 
key realist concept of power had been a significant component of inter-
national thought in the United States in the early 1930s, well before Carr 
had published The twenty years’ crisis.71  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s this ‘Great Debate’ over the national 
interest began to morph into the story of a ‘First Debate’. In this period 
scholars began to use the framework of a sequence of Great Debates as a 
history about the early years of IR.72 In 1972 William Olson referred to the 
debate as one of several instances of major change in the discipline. He 
listed four key debating divides: precision/eclecticism, realism/idealism, 
generalist/specialist and traditionalist/scientific behaviouralist.73 Despite the 
fact that the scholars who had coined the term ‘Great Debate’ in the 1950s 
had believed that their argument was an example of a long tradition of 
foreign policy debates, a number of authors in this period began to refer to 
new intellectual events as an analogue of an original ‘Great Debate’. 
Morton Kaplan’s seminal World Politics article heralded ‘The new great 
debate: Traditionalism vs. science in international relations’.74 This twenty-
page piece did not deal explicitly with any old Great Debates, but when 
70  Good made a similar distinction to Morgenthau between the realist/idealist philosophical dispute 
amongst academics and foreign policy-oriented debate. R. C. Good, ‘The national interest and political 
realism: Niebuhr’s “debate” with Morgenthau and Kennan’, Journal of Politics 22(4) 1960, pp. 601–2. 
71  Fox and Fox, ‘The teaching of international relations in the United States’, pp. 343–4. 
72  Peter Wilson dubs this era the dawn of ‘disciplinary self-consciousness’. Wilson, ‘The myth of the 
“first great debate”’, p. 8. 
73  William C. Olson, ‘The growth of a discipline’, in Brian Porter, ed., The Aberystwyth papers: 
International politics, 1919–1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 22–7. 
74  Morton A. Kaplan, ‘The new great debate: Traditionalism vs. science in international relations’, World 
Politics 19(1) 1966. Kaplan’s article appeared alongside Hedley Bull’s defence of the classical 
approach. Hedley Bull, ‘International theory: The case for a classical approach’, World Politics 18(3) 
1966. This pair of articles constitute the most recognisable instance of a formal ‘Second Debate’. In 
subsequent discussions of a Second Debate some IR scholars have spoken of traditionalists as realists 
and/or scientists as behaviouralists. 
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Kaplan’s article was reprinted in an edited volume three years later, Klaus 
Knorr and James Rosenau’s introductory chapter provided a more detailed 
comparison of IR’s Great Debates. They introduced the tradition versus 
science divide by contrasting it with realism versus idealism.75  
Knorr and Rosenau used the concept of an earlier debate to characterise 
international relations works published between 1939 and 1960. According 
to their account, the important participants in the first of these debates  
were Carr, Morgenthau, Thomas Cook, Malcolm Moos, and Kenneth 
Thompson.76 Their relevant works were published between 1939 and 1960. 
An Arend Lijphardt article also argued that the idealist/realist argument had 
begun in the 1930s, and continued for the decade following the Second 
World War.77 Although Olson’s piece is evidence of the fact that under-
standing about significant debates in international thought was far from 
settled during the 1970s, the majority of works in this period thought of the 
realist/idealist divide as a new academic tradition, rather than the latest 
edition of a longstanding form of public quarrel.78
Between them, Knorr, Rosenau and Lijphardt devoted only three 
paragraphs to discussion of a First Debate.79 In their brief surveys these 
authors were keen to emphasise the differences between these two 
important academic contests. For Knorr and Rosenau the first debate had 
been about the substance of international politics, whereas more recent 
events were concerned with its mode of analysis. According to Lijphardt 
the earlier debate was not as ‘great’ as the traditionalism/science divide 
75  Klaus Eugen Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Contending approaches to international politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969). 
76  Ibid., p. 12. 
77  Arend Lijphardt, ‘International relations theory: Great debates and lesser debates’, International Social 
Science Journal 26(1) 1974, p. 11. 
78  None of these scholars referred to Morgenthau’s earlier attempt to define the Great Debate sequence in 
IR. 
79  Lijphardt promised a full account of the Great Debates in an article due out that same year, but never 
delivered any details on the realism/idealism divide. Lijphardt, ‘International relations theory’, p. 11. 
See Arend Lijphardt, ‘The structure of theoretical revolution in international relations’, International 
Studies Quarterly 18(1) 1974. 
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because, according to Kuhnian ideas about disciplinary progress, it did not 
constitute a potential paradigmatic shift.80
Despite the fact that scholars in the 1970s had been sceptical with respect 
to the similarities between the two early debates, several 1980s articles 
recounted the tale of two prior Great Debates in their description of the 
important intellectual events of their decade. In this period various authors 
portrayed several different axes of theoretical contention as the successor of 
previous ideological contests in IR. Ray Maghroori scripted a new contest 
between realist and globalist schools as the third in a historical sequence.81 
Michael Banks categorised the first two debates as the most significant 
periods of transformation in disciplinary orthodoxy. He then classified 
arguments between pluralists, realists and structuralists as the most recent 
Great Debate.82 Yosef Lapid briefly referred to ‘realism versus idealism’ and 
‘history versus science’ as precursors of the intellectual struggle tearing at 
the heart of IR. He chose to title clashes between positivists and post-
positivists the Third Debate.83  
The Third Debaters provided a new chronology for the idealism/realism 
divide. All of a sudden, the First Debate was transported further back in 
80  Lijphardt, ‘International relations theory’, p. 20. 
81  Ray Maghroori, ‘Introduction: Major debates in international relations’, in Ray Maghroori and Bennett 
Ramberg, eds, Globalism versus realism: International relations’ third debate (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1982), pp. 9–11. 
82  Michael Banks, ‘The evolution of international relations theory’, in Michael Banks, ed., Conflict in 
world society: A new perspective on international relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984); Michael 
Banks, ‘The international relations discipline: Asset or liability for conflict resolution’, in E. E. Azar 
and J. M. Burton, eds, International conflict resolution (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986); Michael 
Banks, ‘Where we are now’, Review of International Studies 11(3) 1985. Although Banks appears to 
have been the major source for the concept of an inter-paradigm debate, his notion of reconstituting a 
three-way disciplinary struggle was first conceived in James N. Rosenau, The scientific study of foreign 
policy, rev. and enl. edn (New York: Nichols Pub. Co., 1980). Rosenau then used this intellectual 
device to stave off the tendency to conceive intellectual discussion in dichotomous terms. James N. 
Rosenau, ‘Order and disorder in the study of world politics: Ten essays in search of a paradigm’, in 
Maghroori and Ramberg, eds, Globalism versus realism, pp. 1–4. 
83  Yosef Lapid, ‘The third debate: On the prospects of international theory in a post-positivist era’, 
International Studies Quarterly 33(3) 1989, p. 236. Kalevi Holsti and Mark Hoffman are other authors 
to use this concept in this period. However, Hoffman does not refer to the new controversy as a ‘Third 
Debate’, listing two intervening bouts of controversy between a realist/behaviouralist divide in the 
1960s and an ‘interparadigm debate’. Mark Hoffman, ‘Critical theory and the inter-paradigm debate’, 
Millennium 16(2) 1987, p. 231; Kalevi J. Holsti, The dividing discipline: Hegemony and diversity in 
international theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). 
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time. Despite the fact that Tannenbaum and Morgenthau, the first two 
participants explicitly acknowledging their participation in a Great Debate, 
had published their works in the early 1950s, and despite the fact that the 
‘Second Debaters’ had referred to the period between the 1930s and 1960 as 
a Great Debate, the chronology used by this new set of scholars did not 
extend past 1950. Maghroori’s introductory chapter offered a four page 
potted history of the three debate sequence. The only work that Maghroori 
referred to explicitly as a paragon of the period, Morgenthau’s Politics 
among nations, was first published in 1949. However, Maghroori’s version 
of the story located the debate that Morgenthau was ostensibly involved in, 
prior to the Second World War.84 Like Maghroori, Banks spoke of the 
earlier clash between realism and idealism as an interwar academic event. 
He briefly mentioned Carr’s masterly critique of utopianism in 1939, but 
not the supposed debaters that had preceded him.85 Meanwhile, Lapid’s 
discussion of a positivist/post-positivist Third Debate referred to an original 
schism in the 1920s and 1930s. Lapid provided no evidence of any 
historiographical work that he had done on this period of ideational change. 
He also cited Maghroori and Banks as authorities on the Great Debate 
concept, even though their understanding of the relevant participants in a 
Third Debate was inconsistent with his own.86
A misleading way of talking about the scholarship of the interwar years 
accompanied this chronological transplant. In the 1980s scholars began to 
use the term ‘idealism’ to refer specifically to the interwar period. Several 
scholars developed this association by presenting the idealist dominance as 
a logical outgrowth of the First World War. For example, Banks argued that 
‘idealist or liberal views dominated the field, fuelled by the horrors of the 
Great War’.87 Meanwhile, Maghroori recounted the process whereby ‘[a] 
new school of thought arose that called for the renunciation of war as a 
national policy, the institutionalisation of an international order, and the 
replacement of balance-of-power politics by collective security’.88 These 
84  Maghroori, ‘Introduction’, pp. 10–11. 
85  Banks, ‘The evolution of international relations theory’, p. 8. 
86  Lapid, ‘The third debate’, p. 236. 
87  Banks, ‘The evolution of international relations theory’, p. 10. 
88  Maghroori, ‘Introduction’, p. 10. 
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scholars appear to have been unusually unperturbed by the lack of scholarly 
work that explicitly identified with an idealist tradition in this period. They 
also appear to have been unaware of the pre-existing critical stance of 
commentators such as Waldo, Good, Fox and Fox towards the concept of an 
idealist school of IR. 
The Third Debaters had not only fabricated an inappropriate interwar 
theoretical category, they had also exaggerated the distinction between 
realism and idealism. Scholars now referred to this period of intellectual 
development as if scholars worked solely from either side of a controversial 
ideational dichotomy. Maghroori referred to the period as a ‘... clash 
between the realists and idealists’ which involved ‘... a fundamental dis-
agreement about the nature of the international political system and the 
motivations behind state behaviour’.89 Kalevi Holsti labelled the period as 
‘Realism versus Idealism’, and argued that during the First Debate ‘the 
sides [were] drawn up, the issues neatly dichotomized’.90 Lapid dubbed it 
the ‘“idealism versus realism” schism’.91 This notion of a fundamental split 
overlooks Carr’s own attempt to achieve a balance, contradicts the majority 
of work on the subject during the early 1950s, and flies in the face of much 
of the retrospective IR literature in the late 1950s and beyond.92 It is 
important to note how recently the notion of a settled divide became an 
uncontested truth. In 1972 Hedley Bull had written a brief, but compelling 
history of the period which was sceptical about whether anyone actually 
belonged to the camps of realism and idealism. Indeed, he shied away from 
the use of the terms ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, and held the monikers 
‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ in inverted commas throughout. His discussion of 
realism emphasised the important commonalities between ‘realist’ thinkers 
of the time and ‘idealist’ philosophy. 
These writers all present the case against ‘moralism’ at least in partly 
moral terms ... Stated in this way, the defense of the national interest has 
more in common with the ‘idealist’ views against which it is directed than 
89  Ibid. 
90  Holsti, The dividing discipline, p. 4. 
91  Lapid, ‘The third debate’, p. 236. 
92  Compare with Booth’s contention that Carr’s distinction between utopianism and realism was 
fundamentally ambiguous; at times suggestive of an incompatibility, and at others indicating an 
essential harmony. Booth, ‘Security in anarchy’. 
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with the strict ‘Machiavellian’ doctrine that anything is justified by reason 
of state.93
Lijphardt had also voiced uncertainty about the categorical nature of the 
First Debate divide. He noted that after the Second World War the debate 
between realism and idealism consisted largely of conversations amongst 
realists.94
In stark contrast to the recent critical histories written against this scheme 
for understanding international thought, none of the authors involved in 
condoning this story attempted to make a formal case for its existence. This 
perfunctory approach to disciplinary history continues to be found in the 
most recent instances of scholars passing on the idea of a Great Debate 
sequence. Despite the fact that Yosef Lapid devoted no more than a 
paragraph to detailing the history of the Great Debates, his article has been 
the most commonly cited reference on this subject in the last decade.95 
When recent scholars have used the term ‘Third Debate’ they have all 
referred directly to Lapid’s article.96 This group of scholars have been 
primarily interested in the most recent divide in IR rather than the details of 
the historical development of international thought. While these scholars 
93  Hedley Bull, ‘The theory of international politics, 1919–1969’, in Porter, ed., The Aberystwyth papers, 
p. 37. 
94  Lijphardt, ‘International relations theory’, p. 11. 
95  This is primarily due to the fact that Lapid’s work has become the designated source of the ‘Third 
Debate’ label. Knud Erik Jorgensen notes that Lapid’s article ‘has become a marker of a significant 
turn, which in the late 1980s, took place within IR’. Knud Erik Jorgensen, ‘Continental IR theory: The 
best kept secret’, European Journal of International Relations 6(1) 2000, p. 16. 
96  Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics’, European Journal of 
International Relations 3(3) 1997; A. Claire Cutler, ‘Locating “authority” in the global political 
economy’, International Studies Quarterly 43(1) 1999; Ronald J. Deibert, ‘“Exorcismus theoriae”: 
Pragmatism, metaphors and the return of the medieval in IR theory’, European Journal of International 
Relations 3(2) 1997; Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, ‘Between celebration and despair: 
Constructive suggestions for future international theory’, International Studies Quarterly 35(4) 1991; 
K. M. Fierke, ‘Links across the abyss: Language and logic in international relations’, International 
Studies Quarterly 46(3) 2002; V. Spike Peterson, ‘Transgressing boundaries: Theories of knowledge, 
gender and international relations’, Millennium 21(2) 1992; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 
‘Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and constructivism’, European Journal of 
International Relations 4(3) 1998; J. Ann Tickner, ‘Continuing the conversation’, International Studies 
Quarterly 42(1) 1998; J. Ann Tickner, ‘You just don’t understand: Troubled engagements between 
feminists and IR theorists,’ International Studies Quarterly 41(4) 1997; Alexander Wendt, ‘On 
constitution and causation in international relations’, Review of International Studies 24(5) 1998. 
28  DARSHAN VIGNESWARAN AND JOEL QUIRK 
 
 
have evoked the concept of a series of great debates they have not sought to 
document this narrative. Indeed, when this group of authors have referred to 
a ‘Third Debate’, they have not raised the term ‘First Debate’ at all. It seems 
as though the primary remaining vestige of the history of a conflict between 
idealists and realists in IR parlance is the intuitive logic that a first debate 
must have preceded a third. 
THE TRADITION OF GREAT DEBATES: SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Our account of the construction of the First Debate in the literature offers 
vital material to assess and refine the key claims of critical historiography 
in IR. As Thies has already shown, several authors identifying with the 
realist tradition in the late 1940s and early 1950s were responsible for 
producing the realism/idealism divide.97 However, unlike Thies, we are 
less inclined to place blame upon this group of ‘realists’ for the transition 
from analytical to historical tradition. Most of the authors in the period 
Thies has discussed had either directly cast suspicion on the notion of a 
categorical successor in this debate, or had preferred to opt for some sort 
of balance between two philosophical poles. While Carr’s attempt to help 
broker the coming peace, and Morgenthau’s directives for policy in the 
post-war era, may have been responsible for the production of an 
inaccurate debating construct, later scholars attempting to validate new 
meta-theoretical contests were responsible for incorporating a myth into 
disciplinary orthodoxy. The misleading components of the story of the 
First Debate were produced by later scholars who transposed this 
analytical tradition into a perfunctory account of past events. In contrast to 
the critical scholarship on the realist/idealist schism in the 1950s and 
1960s, these scholars did not investigate the literature which surrounded 
the issues to which they referred. Indeed, they engaged in the practice of 
espousing tradition regardless of whether their claims flew in the face of 
existing critical scholarship. The most egregiously deceptive components 
in the story were produced when subsequent theorists picked up this 
narrative scheme and inappropriately transported it back in time. 
Our work also differs from the positions of Smith, Wilson, Wæver and 
Ashworth, who have argued that the disciplinary role of the myth consists 
97  Thies, ‘Progress, history and identity in international relations theory’. 
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of a lesson, or set of lessons that scholars inherit about the nature of their 
tradition. While we accept that scholars have used the notion of a series of 
Great Debates to provide authoritative weight to later theoretical 
contributions, we are not convinced that there is unanimity with respect to 
the morals that have been drawn from this story. Carr and Morgenthau 
appear to have concluded that the realist tradition deserved a privileged 
place in modern international relations scholarship. However, subsequent 
authors condoning this history have yet to make this case in print. Indeed, 
opinions regarding the specific lesson to be drawn from this debating cycle 
have varied according to the interests of the specific author employing the 
rhetorical device. Mark Hoffman used the debating ritual to infer that 
critical theory might be ‘the next stage in the development of International 
Relations Theory’.98 Lapid reflected on the theme of conflictual debate to 
emphasise the way in which IR was being ritually tossed on the winds of 
grand change in the social sciences.99 Banks appeared to emerge with the 
lesson that protagonists of the Third Debate had to get their act together 
because there was a clear need to unseat realism, and the first two debates 
had failed to do away with this dominant paradigm.100 We are therefore 
hesitant to make claims about the truths or morals that more recent scholars 
draw from this story about the past. 
Our account of the First Debate suggests that, rather than the past being 
used to develop lessons for the present, the images of the present have been 
imposed upon our understanding of the past. During the behavioural and 
post-modern revolutions that instigated the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ debates in 
IR, argument about the international realm occurred around meta-theoretical 
axes of debate. Scholars set about confirming or denying the validity of a 
particular way of approaching the ‘international’ as an object of study 
because in each of these struggles the definition of what constituted appro-
priate academic practice was at stake. In many cases, these profound and 
unsettling questions of intellectual propriety sent scholars in search of the 
fundamentals of their profession. The story of a sequence of Great Debates 
established present conflicts as contemporary variants of a traditional 
98  Hoffman, ‘Critical theory and the inter-paradigm debate,’ p. 244. 
99  Lapid, ‘The third debate’, p. 237. 
100  Banks, ‘The evolution of international relations theory’, pp. 10–11. 
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process of academic endeavour, and thereby served to verify such conflicts 
as a meaningful form of scholarly dispute. As scholars began to ritually 
recite this potted history of international thought, the early period of 
academic IR was gradually accepted as an analogue of later philosophical 
controversies, and the new version of the story became accepted as fact. It 
was repeatedly cited as a story of disciplinary development in perfunctory 
and superfluous references to tradition made at the margins of a range of 
academic works.101 At the same time, the ‘history’ of these events, that is, 
the contextual factors which provided much of the meaning to these 
rhetorical expositions, was either forgotten, or simply disregarded.102
Contemporary critical historiography in IR is devoted to overcoming this 
sort of dramatic flaw in our understanding of the past. We believe that 
contextualism is a useful method for this ongoing project because it exhibits 
the inconsistencies in the stories that simplistic historical schemes tend to 
paper over. We have been able to show how a contextual approach helps 
avoid a tendency to either abstract ideas from their historical setting, or 
provide stories of intellectual development that transgress the constraints of 
accurate chronology. We do not want to suggest that contextualism per se 
will help to rid the discipline of these tendencies.103 Our claim is that the 
pursuit of a rigorous contextual method forces scholars to consistently 
reconcile meaning with historical context, and to move their attention away 
from analytical constructs, and toward what the ‘internal’ historians 
visualise as an ideal, that is, a more accurate appreciation of the historical 
tradition. 
101  This reading concurs with Eric Hobsbawm’s work on the invention of tradition. He has suggested that 
invented traditions are ‘responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, 
or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition’. The First Debate may be seen as this 
same sort of response to the new. Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds, The invention of 
tradition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 2. 
102  Wæver noted that the tendency to ignore context is linked to the assumption that work within the 
discipline is defined by a transhistorical problematic. Wæver, ‘Figures of international thought’, p. 690. 
103  We agree with Schmidt that crude forms of contextual argument pose equally significant problems for 
our ability to understand and narrate the history of the discipline. In several of the stories of a First 
Debate, ‘real world’ events in the period leading up to, and during, the Second World War are 
presented as the key background for this story. However, none of these authors have combined their 
understanding of contextual factors with a detailed textual reading in order to develop the sort of 
historical narrative that we have offered here. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 
politics: Trend and transformation, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1989); Lijphardt, 
‘International relations theory’; Maghroori, ‘Introduction’. 
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Adopting this method of reading past work has provided us with a new 
perspective on our scholarly tradition. This study has illuminated the 
differences between, on the one hand, the purposive dimension of con-
temporary scholarship, and on the other, the academic agendas of past work. 
This method has rescued a defining, and largely forgotten, feature of early 
intellectual discussions, that is, the policy-driven conception of international 
thought adopted by scholars of several persuasions during and around the 
Second World War. There is a qualitative difference between the motives 
which provoke today’s scholars to venture into theoretical debate, and the 
academic purposes of the wartime and post-war era. Prior to 1950, the cause 
of defending a particular theoretical approach, or paradigm, against that of 
an alternative, or competing school did not appear to be the main priority 
for scholars engaged in discussing the conflict between idealist/utopian and 
realist ideas. Carr and Morgenthau’s separate assaults against utopianism 
were only partly concerned with the works of contemporary academics, and 
primarily directed towards the transformation of the broad tradition of 
international thought in their respective countries. Both authors feared a 
dominance of utopian thinking because of their particular interpretation of 
the failures of the interwar years and their respective prescriptions for 
contemporary foreign policy. They were intimately concerned with the post-
war peace process, and specifically, the contribution of Britain and the 
United States to the construction of a new international order. Those authors 
who were critical of the anti-utopian position, like Angell, Woolf, Hayek, 
Tannenbaum and Fox, were primarily concerned with the consequences of 
accepting a narrowly conceived notion of interests as the basis of Anglo-
American statesmanship, and more broadly, of democratic rule altogether. 
Finally, those authors, like Niebuhr, Wolfers, Woolf and Herz, who expli-
citly sought to challenge the dichotomous view of international thought, 
were intent on showing that if scholars adopted either approach, to the 
neglect of the other, rational approaches to international dilemmas became 
impossible.  
When Morgenthau first coined the term ‘Great Debate’ in his reply to 
Tannenbaum, he was struck by recent developments in international 
thought, because ritual conflict in American foreign policy circles usually 
centred on policy options. In this new discussion scholars tended to corral 
around alternative ‘philosophies’ or ‘standards of thought’. In later decades 
IR would gradually develop into an academic discipline that was marked by 
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conflicting, and sometimes mutually exclusive approaches to the subject. 
Argument that validates a particular school at the expense of another is now 
the dominant style of rhetoric in the field. The changing character of 
disciplinary discussion during the late 1940s and early 1950s period that 
Morgenthau bore witness to goes generally unnoticed by recent theorists 
because the version of the story of a First Debate in common currency in 
contemporary IR is Lapid’s brief notation of a dispute in the 1920s and 
1930s. This process, whereby disciplinary discussion began to occur in 
isolation from public affairs of the day, has also not been readily noticed by 
scholars adopting an internal approach because they are methodologically 
predisposed to viewing IR as if it existed in isolation from its constitutive 
contextual factors. We believe that the tendency to ignore these issues will 
help to foster myths about the disciplinary past. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Studying the construction and reproduction of the story of a First Debate 
has substantially changed our own perspective on the IR tradition. At the 
beginning of this research process we took an interest in the concept of a 
First Debate because we were inclined to think that it was an outright 
furphy which members of the prevailing orthodoxy had consciously, and 
inappropriately, imposed upon the past. Wæver’s claim that ‘[t]he First 
Debate … was not so much a discussion as a heroic post-hoc self-
presentation by the (self-proclaimed) realists’ appeared to support this 
hunch.104 However, our subsequent investigations have revealed that the 
making of the tradition of IR has been less fantastic and conspiratorial 
than we originally supposed, but perhaps more relentlessly problematic 
than we had first suspected. The First Debate is a story that refers to a real 
set of developments in the history of academic IR, and we are yet to be 
convinced that a scholar, or group of scholars, has consciously constructed 
this story to create boundaries within the discipline. Instead, the problem 
with the story is `that a set of scholars concerned with defining recent 
events have clumsily attached an entirely inappropriate chronology to this 
past set of texts in the face of a significant store of contradictory 
historiographical evidence. While our fears of scandal within the discip-
line have been allayed by these findings, they have also been replaced by 
104  Wæver, ‘Figures of international thought’, p. 9. 
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a more sombre dissatisfaction at the remarkable complacency of our 
discipline with regard to the intellectual history that we share.105 Our 
disappointment is particularly acute because the most personally reward-
ing feature about this research has been the critical perspective on the 
purposive dimension of our profession that we have acquired by going 
back and investigating the contours of discussion on international affairs 
in an entirely different historical setting. In particular, our surveys of 
scholarship in the interwar and post-war era introduced an alternative, 
more socially oriented, way of thinking about the reasons for engaging in 
a core practice of our discipline, the formal debate. Since making this 
discovery we have been less interested in the obvious inconsistencies of 
the myth itself, and more concerned with the tendency of scholars to 
endorse orthodox history without interrogating the texts to which they 
refer. It appears to be this common predilection for perfunctory tradi-
tionalism, rather than any underhanded obfuscation of historical fact, that 
perpetuates dubious orthodoxy in contemporary IR. We hope that our 
article has successfully exposed the serious implications of casual 
references to invented tradition. 
105  One of the most common responses to our critique of the First Debate has been that it serves as a useful 
teaching device. Despite his criticism of the myth of a First Debate, Wilson is willing to concede that it 
has merit as a pedagogical device. Meanwhile Chris Brown’s text book for students of IR narrates the 
story of a First Debate in full. Given our belief that myths like these thrive off a casual attitude to the 
way in which historiography is handed down we are wary of any attempt to perpetuate this myth, and 
particularly sceptical of its use as a way of inducting scholars into the discipline. Chris Brown, 
Understanding international relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), chapter 2; Wilson, ‘The 
myth of the “first great debate”’, p. 1. 
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